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Abstract
In this paper I argue that there is no motivation to support the Strong Indexical
Theory of Names as opposed to its counterpart the Weak Indexical Theory of Names.
The Strong Indexical Theory, as proposed by Pelczar, argues that names are indexicals.
According to Pelczar, names are context-sensitive to an antecedently performed speechact, which fixes the referent in that context. However, the content of ambiguous terms
can also be fixed by a speech-act, and so according to the strong theory ambiguous terms
are indexicals. Furthermore, the meaning of any term can also shift over time and thus
unambiguous terms could potentially become ambiguous in the future. Hence, I argue
that all terms, ambiguous and unambiguous, are indexicals according to the Strong
Indexical Theory of Names. However, indexicals are different from other terms in that
the content of an indexical is determined through a single social convention, while the
content of all other terms, including names, are determined through two social
conventions. Thus, as I argue, names are in the same semantic category as ambiguous
terms, which is the main thesis of the Weak Indexical Theory of Names. Moreover, the
Strong Indexical Theory claims to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes through
an appeal to the reflexive character of names. Yet, the weak alternative also agrees that
names have a reflexive character and can also resolve the problem through the same
method. In the end, there is no motivation to support the strong theory as opposed to the
Weak Indexical Theory of Names.
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1. Introduction
The Direct Reference Theory of Names argues that names directly refer to the
object, which they name in all possible worlds. The name is fixed to the object at some
naming ceremony. Any person who uses the name to refer to the object should intend to
use it in the same way as it was used in the naming ceremony. However, as Gareth Evans
argues, the referent of some names can change over time. In an attempt to respond to this
objection to the Direct Reference Theory, the Indexical Theory of Names was developed.
The name of the theory comes from a comparison between names and indexicals. Names
are similar to indexicals in that they both have two levels of meaning and a reflexive
character. Indexicals have a character and a content, and names have a linguistic and a
non-linguistic meaning. A reflexive character means that when the referent of the name
or indexical is unclear, the hearer can still determine the truth conditions of the statement.
The theory offers a successful resolution to Evans’ objection by arguing that the referent
of the name can be determined by the context of the utterance, similar to an utterance
with an indexical. Yet there are two alternatives to the indexical theory of names: the
strong version and the weak version. First, the weak version argues that names are similar
to indexicals, but are not indexical. Rather, names are more similar to ambiguous terms.
On the other hand, the strong theory claims that names are indexicals. Pelczar offers a
direct argument for the indexicality of names and three subsequent arguments against the
weak theory.
In this paper I will argue that if the strong theory is correct, and names are
indexical, then all ambiguous terms are also indexical. This is because ambiguous terms
are sensitive to the definition, namely the definition that the speaker appeals to.
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Furthermore, all terms might have multiple meanings in the future and for this reason all
terms could be ambiguous and thus indexical. However, this is an untenable consequence
that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names cannot hold because there is something
distinct about indexicals. The difference, I argue, is that names and ambiguous terms are
doubly conventional while pure indexicals are singly conventional. Thus names are not
indexicals, but they are more like ambiguous terms. Hence, the strong theory’s claim that
names are indexical is to no avail. Furthermore, I show that the problem of propositional
attitudes, that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names claims to resolve, can also be dealt
with by the weak theory through the same strategy. Finally, I respond to Rami’s objection
to the weak theory, saying that there is an equivocation between the linguistic and nonlinguistic meaning of a name. In the end, there is no reason to favor the strong theory as
opposed to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names.

2. The Direct Reference Theory of Names
Saul Kripke developed the Direct Reference Theory of Names in his seminal
work Naming and Necessity.1 In this work, he purports that names directly refer to the
same object in all possible worlds. This view is opposed to the descriptivist theory that
claims a name is able to pick out its referent through some intermediate sense. Kripke
proposes the modal, semantic, and epistemic arguments against descriptivism, which
demonstrate that the sense of a name is unable to uniquely identify the referent. He
proposes that names do not have a meaning, or sense, but simply rigidly designate the
same object across all possible worlds.
1

Kripke (1980)
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How the name comes to designate the referent is a question that Kripke does not
directly answer. However, in a footnote he gives a rough outline of the causal theory of
how the name becomes fixed with the referent. He suggests that there is an initial baptism
of the object, and the name is fixed to the referent by the description.2 During this initial
baptism the description is not synonymous with the name, as in descriptivism, but instead
is used to fix the name with the referent. For instance, when a baby is born, there is a
ceremony where the parents baptize the child with the name. Yet, the only way to fix the
name to the child is through some description or demonstration, e.g. this child here
(pointing to the child). During this naming ceremony the description is not synonymous
with the name, but it is simply used to fix the referent.
Once the name of the referent is fixed, then the causal chain begins. Those who
were present at the baptism will pass on the name to those who were not present, and so
on. When the name is passed on from one person to the next, Kripke thinks that the
receiver must intend to use the same referent as the person who told it to him.3 If this link
is kept strong and those who use the name all have the same referent, then it does not
matter if the description of the referent is incorrect. For instance, when we talk about
Benjamin Franklin, so long as the referent remains fixed, then it is not important if our
description of him is complete or accurate. However, we have quite a bit of difficulty
keeping the name and the reference fixed. Kripke gives the example of the names ‘St.
Nicolas’ and ‘Santa Claus’ as an instance of how the referent can change over time. At
one point in time, the two names referred to the same person, but over time a disconnect

2
3

Kripke (1980) p. 96
Ibid.
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grew. Gareth Evans uses this inconsistency to note a potential problem for Kripke’s
theory of names.4
Evans acknowledges that Kripke does not fully endorse the causal theory, but
Evans uses the rough outline as a starting point. His objection to the causal theory is that
it cannot account for instances when the referent of the name shifts. He uses the example
of Madagascar to demonstrate how the referent of a name can shift. The natives of Africa
use the name ‘Madagascar’ to refer to the part of the African mainland. When Marco
Polo traveled to this part of the world, he came to learn how the native inhabitants used
the name. Later, through a miscommunication with Malay or Arab sailors, the name
became used to designate the island off the coast of Africa. This miscommunication
between Marco Polo and the other sailors led to the name ‘Madagascar’ designating the
island. According to Evans, the causal theory of names is not able to account for this shift
since the name was fixed at the initial baptism. Evans says, “The intention of the speakers
to use the name to refer to something must be allowed to count in determination of what
it denotes.”5 He suggests that something more than the initial baptism is needed to ground
the name to the referent, which, in this case, is the speaker’s intention. The Indexical
Theory of Names purports to resolve this issue by making the referent of the name
sensitive to context.

3. Content and Character

4
5

Evans (1973) (1980)
Evans (1973) p. 196
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Before I expand on the Indexical Theory of Names, I first need to explain David
Kaplan’s theory of indexicals and his use of the character content distinction. When I say
the phrase ‘I am hungry’ it expresses something different than when you say ‘I am
hungry’. Clearly we have said two different things if the truth value is different, but in
this instance we each might have said something different despite them both being true.
The difference in this circumstance is what Kaplan calls the content. He defines content
as a “function from circumstances of evaluation to an appropriate extension.”6 So the
content of the sentence,
(1) John went snowboarding today
is 〈John, went, snowboarding, 3/25/2015〉. If you wanted to express the same content the
next day, you would have to say
(2) John went snowboarding yesterday
The content of this latter sentence is the same as the former even though the verbal
expressions are different.
The character of a word is generally thought of as the meaning because most
words have the same content in all contexts. This is called a constant character and a
constant content. So in all context and circumstances of evaluation the word has the same
extension. However, indexicals have a non-constant content because their content
changes from context to context. From above, the contents of (1) and (2) are the same,
but the character of the terms ‘today’ and ‘yesterday’ are different. Both of these terms
have a constant character that is able to determine the content. Kaplan notes that
character is neither directly referential nor always able to determine the content in each
6

Kaplan p. 502
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context.7 By this he means that there are situations when the character of a word fails to
pick out the content. For instance, if you came across a piece of paper with the sentence
(3) ‘I like snowboarding’
written on it, from this context it is not possible to determine the extension of this
sentence, nor is it possible to determine the referent. The character of this sentence is 〈the
writer of this sentence, likes, snowboarding, t1〉. The Indexical Theory of Names makes
use of this distinction between character and content and purports that names have a
similar distinction. A proper name has two meanings: the linguistic and the non-linguistic
meaning. The linguistic meaning is similar to the character, and the non-linguistic
meaning is similar to the content.

4. Indexical Theory
Paula Milne gives a general summary of the indexical theory in her paper To
What Extent Do Proper Names Resemble Indexicals?8 She suggests that there are two
main versions to indexical theories, what I call the Strong Indexical Theory and the Weak
Indexical Theory. The strong alternative purports that names are indexicals, while the
weak version claims that names are indexical-like, but not indexicals. The former thinks
that names are context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force (I will explain this term later in
Section 7 of this paper), similar to how ‘I’ is sensitive to the utterer or ‘now’ is sensitive
to the time of the utterance. The latter theory argues that context is used to narrow down
the possible content of the name in an utterance, more similar to how context helps to

7
8

Kaplan p. 505
Milne (2005)
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determine the meaning of an ambiguous term. Both of these versions of the indexical
theory agree that names and indexicals both have a reflexive character. Reflexive
character means that the hearer of an utterance might not be able to determine the content
of the statement, but they would be able to understand the truth conditions that would
make the statement true. The reflexive character is employed for indexicals when the
hearer is not sure who or where or when the statement was uttered, and for names when
the referent of the name is unclear to the hearer.
Take, for example, the sentence,
(4) Barack Obama likes dogs.
This sentence is true iff there is a person and this person bears the name ‘Barack Obama’
that is causally linked to the person through a naming ceremony, and that person also
likes dogs. The linguistic meaning of the name ‘Barack Obama’ is that there is a person
who bears this name and this person may or may not have the property of liking dogs.
The linguistic-meaning does not require that the person have the property of liking dogs.
This is only important for the truth conditions of a sentence with a name. The nonlinguistic meaning of ‘Barack Obama’ is that there is a person who is causally linked to
the name through a naming ceremony. Similar to sentence (3), even if the referent of the
name is unclear, the truth conditions of the sentence are apparent, namely (4) is true iff
there is a person who bears the name Barack Obama and that person likes dogs. So, an
understanding of the sentence does not require that the hearer have an acquaintance with
the referent, but that the hearer understands that ‘Barack Obama’ is a name and that a
social convention is being employed.

Costigan
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Along with giving a linguistic meaning of names, the indexical theory is able to
account for the problem of shifting reference. The indexical theory says that the referent
of a name is determined by the context of the current situation. Since, for instance, the
current social convention associated with ‘Madagascar’ refers to the island, when the
name is used it refers to the island. However, if someone wanted to specify that they were
referring to the part of the mainland, then they would be expected to explicitly say
something to the effect of, ‘the part of the mainland formerly known as Madagascar’. In
this context, the reference of the sentence is fixed.

5. John Perry’s Theory
John Perry argues that names are similar but different from indexicals. First, he
purports that names are similar to indexicals because in both cases context is used to
determine the referent.9 Each name is associated with many different people through
different naming conventions. When the token of a name is used in a sentence the hearer
might not be able to determine whom the sentence is designating. In a typical
conversation, if someone says,
(5) Frank was brave
‘Frank’ could refer to any of the multitude of individuals with that name. But Perry
follows the Gricean conversational maxims, namely quality and relation. The maxim of
relation stipulates that the interlocutors should only make relevant comments. So when
the audience hears this utterance, they should assume that the speaker is talking about a
Frank that they mutually know. Furthermore, the maxim of quality requires that the
9

Perry p. 7
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interlocutors tried to be truthful. So if they mutually know more than one person named
Frank, then the audience should assume that the speaker is referring to the Frank that did
something brave. But, again, if the referent of the sentence is still not clear, then Perry
suggests that the audience ask whom the speaker is talking about.
Yet, Perry thinks that names are not indexicals because context is being used in a
different way to determine the referent. For indexicals, it is the meaning of the word that
determines the contextual relation between the utterance and the referent, e.g., the
meaning of ‘I’ determines that the referent is the utterer or writer. On the other hand,
names use context to narrow down the different possible naming conventions that the
speaker is exploiting. This is what is happening in the example of Frank from above.
Perry calls this ambiguity as opposed to indexicality,10 because context is used in the
same way as ambiguous terms.

6. Pelczar’s Arguments for The Strong Indexical Theory of Names
Pelczar offers a direct argument for the indexicality of names, and then offers
three arguments against Perry’s conclusion. The direct argument purports that there is a
difference between ambiguous terms and names. Thus, names should not be considered
to be ambiguous. Pelczar thinks that Perry’s argument against the indexicality of names
can be interpreted in three different ways: names are not indexicals because they lack
specificity, are not tidy, and are underdetermined. Pelczar’s three arguments show that
there are some indexicals that do not meet these three criteria, yet are still considered

10

Perry p.7
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indexicals. Since Perry’s argument does not preclude indexicals that do not meet these
criteria, proper names should not be precluded from being indexicals.

6.1 Direct Argument
Pelczar argues that there is a difference between ambiguous terms and names. For
a person to be considered a competent user of an ambiguous term, such as bill, they do
not need to understand all of the different meanings. For example, if a person did not
understand the sentence ‘The tractor drove over the bill’, but did understand the meaning
of the sentence ‘I received a huge gas bill’, then we would maintain that they are still a
competent user of the term ‘bill’ in the latter sense. Meaning that if a person does not
understand one use of a word it is not counted against his being a competent user of the
term, so long as he understands one of the meanings of the term. On the other hand, if a
person did not understand the meaning of the sentence using a name like ‘Bill’, we could
count this one instance against him as not knowing the linguistic meaning of the name
‘Bill’. In other words, if a person did not understand the meaning of a sentence with a
name, because they did not understand that name, then this person does not understand
the reflexive truth conditions of the name. For a person to be a competent user of a name
they must be able to understand the linguistic meaning in more than one instance of the
name. Pelczar argues that being a competent user of a name is similar to being a
competent user of an indexical. If a person is a competent user of an indexical, they must
be able to understand the meaning in more than one instance. Thus, Pelczar concludes
that names are not simply ambiguous, but are actually indexicals.
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6.2 Pelczar’s Arguments Against Perry
Pelczar takes Perry to mean that names are different from indexicals because
names lack specificity, are messy, and are underdetermined. First, each indexical has a
different meaning that is able to determine the referent of the sentence. This idea opposes
that of names, which have a general meaning that is able to determine the referent.
Pelczar claims that this is not true for all indexicals such as ‘this’ and ‘that’. These two
indexicals have the same meaning that determines the referent. So the terms ‘this’ and
‘that’ have the same meaning, i.e. the object that the speaker is pointing to. Since a lack
of specificity does not preclude these terms from being indexicals, Pelczar argues that it
should not preclude names either.
Next, Pelczar takes Parry to argue that indexicals have a tidy rule that is able to
pick out the referent, while names seem to be messy. Pelczar thinks that an appeal to
social conventions to determine the referent “quickly leads to the consideration of
multifarious factors, semantic, pragmatic, and even extra-linguistic, that, to say the least,
resist tidy encapsulation.”11 On the other hand, the rules for indexicals are more candid.
For instance, the rule for ‘now’ is the time of the utterance. However, Pelczar argues that
not all indexicals have such orderly meanings. Consider the meaning of the term ‘here’,
which is not so clearly defined. When a person says, “Steve lives here,” it is not clear
where ‘here’ is referring to, i.e. the room, the house, the town or the country in which the
speaker is located. Since the vagueness of the meaning does not seem to preclude ‘here’
from being an indexical, Pelczar concludes that name should not be ruled out for this
reason.
11

Pelczar (2001) p. 143
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Finally, Pelczar takes Perry to argue that names are underdetermined and hence
are not indexicals. Take the example (5) from above. In this example it is not clear to
whom the speaker is referring and the audience is supposed to ask which Frank the
speaker was referring to. In this instance, the name is underdetermined and the referent is
identified by the speaker’s intentions. On the contrary, indexicals are always supposed to
determine the referent, e.g. ‘I’ always identifies the speaker.12 But Pelczar argues that this
is not the case for all indexicals, such as ‘he’. The meaning of the term ‘he’ is the salient
male, but the referent is not always salient. Suppose the speaker is comparing three males
and says, “He is the strongest,” The speaker’s intentions might not be clear and the
audience might have to ask to whom he is referring. Again, since indexicals like ‘he’ are
not precluded from being indexicals because the referent is underdetermined, it follows
that names should not be ruled out as being indexicals for this same reason.13

7. The Strong Indexical Theory of Names
The character of a word depends on the kind of context to which an utterance
might be sensitive. According to Kaplan, the character might be sensitive to four types of
context: utterer, time, spatial position, and possible world.14 So ‘I’ is sensitive to the
utterer, ‘now’ is sensitive to the time, and so on. Pelczar suggested a fifth type of context

12

When a person uses the term ‘I’ they are referring to themselves. However, there are
instances when a person is directly quoting another person and in this case ‘I’ is referring
to the original utterer of the quote.
13
Milne claims that Pelczar’s objections to Perry’s argument are based on a
misinterpretation of Reflexivity, Indexicality and Names. Furthermore, she argues that
Perry is able to answer these objections, although he has not directly addressed them
himself.
14
Kaplan p. 498
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sensitivity. He says, “[T]he significance of an utterance sometimes depends on contextual
factors determined by antecedently-performed speech acts.”15 In this case the speaker
makes a stipulation that is supposed to influence how the audience understands the
ensuing statement(s). This stipulation is what Pelczar calls the ‘dubbing-in-force’. A
dubbing is similar to Kripke’s naming ceremony, where a name is fixed to the referent.
The dubbing is said to be ‘in force’ if the item that was named in that dubbing ceremony
bears the name that it was given in that ceremony. Pelczar asserts, if dubbing-in-force is a
kind of context sensitivity, then all words that are fixed by a dubbing ceremony – such as
names – are indexical.
Pelczar says that the idea of dubbing-in-force is very complex and hence he does
not give a systematic way to determine which dubbings are in force in a given context.
Although, he notes that it cannot be the person who has been dubbed with a name at the
time of an utterance because there will be countless people who have been dubbed with a
name. It is when there is more than one dubbing-in-force that causes confusion.
Confusions leads to problems like Hesperus and Phosphorus, since there are two
dubbings-in-force for the same object. Similar to Perry, the audience can simply ask their
interlocutor which dubbing is in force. When your interlocutor gives an answer, one of
the contending dubbings-in-force becomes salient. Also, the dubbing-in-force might
become salient through context of the conversation, taking for granted the Gricean
maxims of conversation.
Pelczar looks at the Madagascar example from Evans’ objection, mentioned
earlier in Section 2. He states that this example is clearer because the dubbings-in-force
15

Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 294
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vary over time. Pelczar claims that indexicals are on a spectrum from high frequency of
variability to low frequency of variability. He claims that indexicals either have
synchronic variability, meaning it varies across contexts of utterance in the same time, or
diachronic variability, meaning it varies over time.16
To say that a competent speaker knows the meaning of a name does not mean that
they are required to know the referent of the name. This is because to understand the
meaning of a sentence with an indexical, you do not need to understand the referent of
the indexical. Rather to be a competent speaker of the language, you would only need to
understand the character of the indexical. Similarly, Pelczar purports that when a
competent speaker knows the meaning of a name, they understand that the name refers to
the item that was named in the dubbing-in-force in the context of the utterance. In other
words, when a competent speaker knows the meaning of a name, they only need to know
the linguistic meaning and are not required to know the non-linguistic meaning.

8. Arguments Against The Strong Indexical Theory of Names
First, I want to show that the Strong Indexical Theory of Names leads to the
conclusion that all words are indexicals. By this, I mean to show that if the Strong
Indexical Theory is correct and names are context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force, then
other ambiguous terms are sensitive to the definition-in-force. Furthermore, even
unambiguous terms could be sensitive to the definition-in-force and hence all terms are
context sensitive and thus indexicals. However, the Strong Indexical Theory of Names

16

He does say that this list might not be exhausted. That is, indexicals might vary in
some fashion other than synchronic or diachronic.
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would need to give an explanation for the difference between pure indexicals and other
terms. This explanation is that indexicals are singly conventional while other terms are
doubly conventional. Thus, names, as being doubly conventional, are in the same
category as ambiguous terms and not indexicals, which was the original position of the
Weak Indexical Theory. My second objection to the Strong Indexical Theory of Names is
that there is no motivation for supporting the strong alternative as opposed to the weak
theory, because both theories agree with the linguistic meaning and reflexive truth
conditions of both names and indexicals.

8.1 Strong Leads to Weak
The motivation for my first objection comes from Pelczar’s argument that a name
is sensitive to an antecedently performed speech act.17 This sensitivity means that there
are circumstances when a person might qualify their statement to direct the audience to a
specific content. When a person qualifies their statement regarding a specific person to
whom they are referring, it is called the “dubbing-in-force.” For example, if the speaker
wanted to refer to the Madagascar as the native Africans did, he would have to stipulate
that he is referring to the part of the African mainland. In this circumstance, when the
audience hears the name ‘Madagascar’ they understand that the name is referring to the
part of the African mainland. Since the referent of the name is sensitive to stipulations of
the speaker, Pelczar thinks that names should be considered indexicals.
Yet, a speaker can make stipulations about the meaning of any word in an
utterance to ensure that the audience is directed to a specific content. Although this
17

Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 294
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speech-act is not a dubbing-in-force (because dubbing only refers to a naming ceremony),
it might be called something different – such as the “definition-in-force.” So the
definition is the meaning of the word or phrase, and the definition is in force in a certain
context if, in that context, the word bears the meaning of that definition. For instance, a
speaker might say, “By key I mean the crucial step, and the key to opening the door is
pulling the handle up before pushing the door open.” In this statement, the speaker
stipulated that the definition-in-force for the term ‘key’ is the crucial step. So ambiguous
terms are sensitive to the same antecedently performed speech act – the definition-inforce. Since terms are contextually sensitive to the definition-in-force, as names are
sensitive to dubbings-in-force, then all potentially ambiguous terms are an indexical; that
is, any term that has multiple and varying lexical meanings.
Furthermore, since the definition of a term can change over time, then any term
could be ambiguous with respect to some future meaning. Suppose that there is a word
that is unambiguous, that is, it has one and only one meaning.18 Seeing as this word
currently has only one meaning does not imply that in the future this word could not have
more than one meaning. This multiplication of meanings is similar to the Madagascar
example, in that the meaning of the word changes very slowly over time. So slow, in fact,
that we have not seen it change yet, but this slow evolution does not mean that it will not
change in the future. Thus, even terms that are not ambiguous (at least not ambiguous
yet) would also be considered indexicals under the standards set by the Strong Indexical
Theory of Names.

18

I say supposing there is such a terms, because I am not sure if any word has only one
definition
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So if we take names to be context sensitive to the dubbing-in-force, all terms are
context sensitive with respect to some antecedent speech act. However, if all terms are
indexical, then what makes pure indexicals (as Kaplan thought of them) different from
other terms?19 Pelczar says that the difference between names and pure indexicals is that
names are connected to the referent through some social convention, the dubbing.20 If we
take the character of a word to be a social convention, then indexicals would also
determine the referent through a convention. It follows that names are doubly
conventional, that is, the referent is fixed through the antecedent speech act and through
the character of the term, while only the character fixes the referent of the indexical.
Similarly, all other terms would be doubly conventional, and the distinction between pure
indexicals and other terms would be this level of social convention. Thus, names are in
the same category as ambiguous terms while indexicals are different. Since this is the
original thesis of the Weak Indexical Theory of Names, the strong theory’s claim that
names are indexical is to no avail.

8.2. The Indexical Theory of Names and Propositional Attitudes
One of the main motives for accepting the Strong Indexical Theory of Names is
that it purports to explain the problem of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude
is a relation between a person’s mental state and a proposition, e.g. Justin believes that P.
The problem of propositional attitude is that some proposition that a person holds might
be inconsistent. For example,

19
20

Kaplan through that pure indexicals are terms such as ‘I’, ‘Here’, ‘Now’
Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) p. 297-8
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(6) Justin believes that Bob Dylan has musical talent and that Robert Zimmerman
does not have musical talent.
This belief is inconsistent because Bob Dylan and Robert Zimmerman are the same
person. The problem of propositional attitudes is to explain how a coherent person can
have inconsistent propositional attitudes. This is a problem that the direct reference
theory is unable to resolve because names directly refer and can be substituted salva
veritate.
Although this argument is not successful, it is worth noting that both indexical
theories of names are able to resolve this issue through the same strategy. Pelczar argues
that when an indexical is within a propositional attitude, the subject is not required to
understand the non-linguistic meaning of the indexical or the content. Within a
propositional attitude the subject is only required to know the character of the indexical.
So take the sentence,
(7) Mary believes that I am tall.
Mary can understand the meaning of this sentence without understanding the content of
the sentence. Thus, Mary can understand the truth conditions of the sentence without
understanding who is the referent of the indexical. Mary understands that (7) is true iff
the utterer of the sentence is tall, without her knowing who uttered the sentence. Pelczar
argues that this line of thought also applies to names in the same way. So for the
sentence,
(8) Mary believes that Tom Costigan is tall.
Pelzcar thinks that for Mary to understand the meaning of this sentence, she only needs to
understand the linguistic meaning of the name. For Mary to understand this sentence, she
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needs to know that there is a person who was named ‘Tom Costigan’ in a naming
ceremony and that that person is tall. So in statements like,
(9) Thales believes that Hesperus is shining and disbelieves that Phosphorus is
shining.21
Thales is coherent because he understands the linguistic meaning of the sentence, even
though he does not know that both Hesperus and Phosphorus refer to the same object. So
the solution to the puzzle, according to the Strong Indexical Theory, is that a person can
be coherent and have inconsistent propositional attitudes because the person does not
have to know the content of the name to understand the sentence. In other words, to be
coherent the person only needs to understand the linguistic meaning of the name, that is,
the reflexive truth conditions.
The weak version of the indexical theory, however, would be able to explain
propositional attitudes in the same way. The weak version of this theory suggests that
names are similar to indexicals because they have a reflexive truth condition. So the
linguistic meaning of statement (7) is ‘Mary believes that the utterer of this sentence is
tall’. Similarly, the linguistic meaning of statement (8) is that there is some person who is
linked to the name ‘Tom Costigan’ through some naming convention, and that that
person is tall. Since the Strong Indexical Theory of Names resolves this puzzle through
an appeal to the linguistic meaning of a name and the reflexive truth conditions, the weak
theory is also able to resolve the puzzle because the weak theory agrees that names have a
linguistic meaning and reflexive truth conditions. Thus, the Strong Indexical Theory is
not able to solve this puzzle in a way that is not available to the Weak Indexical Theory.
21
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However, since both theories suppose that names are directly referential, it suggests that
neither theory is truly able to resolve this puzzle. Thus, even if the Strong Indexical
Theory of Names was able to resolve this problem, there would be no reason to prefer it
because the Weak Indexical Theory of Names is able to exploit the same strategies.

9. Objections and Replies
Rami raises an objection to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names, which he calls
the problem of shared names. He argues that homophonic ambiguous terms have
different origins, histories, and meanings. By this he means that there are two different
words with different meanings, but coincidently have the same pronunciation (and
spelling).22 Rami says that for the Weak Indexical Theory of Names “different referents
correspond to different meanings of a name”.23 Thus he claims that in each naming
ceremony there is a new name that is being used to refer to that object, albeit the same
pronunciation and spelling as similar names. For instance, when a person is named
‘George’ at a naming ceremony this is a different name than the one given to any other
person named George. To differentiate between these two names a subscripted number
might be used. So, in this naming ceremony the person would be named ‘GeorgeN’. Thus
he concludes that if names are ambiguous terms, then no two objects can have the very
same name. Since we do think that two objects can have the same name, we should reject
the notion that names are ambiguous terms.
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words, so I will not consider heterotrophic examples of homophonic words.
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Rami p. 123
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However, this objection is grounded in an equivocation between the kinds of
meaning a term has. The Weak Indexical Theory of Names thinks that there is a linguistic
meaning and a non-linguistic meaning of terms. An ambiguous term is ambiguous
because it has different linguistic meanings. For example, the term ‘tap’ has more than
one linguistic meaning or definition. It could mean, among other things, a faucet for
drawing water from a pipe or a light touch or stroke. This word seems to have come from
different histories and origins24, as Rami suggests, but coincidently has the same
pronunciation and spelling. On the other hand, names are ambiguous because they have
different non-linguistic meanings. The non-linguistic meaning of a name is fixed to the
object during the naming ceremony. So, the non-linguistic meaning of the name ‘George’
is different for each person who shares that name. Yet, the name has the same linguistic
meaning, i.e. a person named George. So when two people share the same name this
means that their names have the same linguistic meaning, but they have different nonlinguistic meanings. Thus, Rami’s objection to the Weak Indexical Theory of Names is
based on an equivocation between the different kinds of meanings a term or name can
have.
Furthermore, the Weak Indexical Theory of Names does not claim that names are
ambiguous terms. The theory, as propounded by Perry, argues that names are merely
similar to ambiguous terms. Both ambiguous terms and names use context in a similar
way, i.e. to narrow down the possible meanings of the term or name. But again, the
difference between ambiguous terms and names is that the former has many linguistic
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meanings while the latter has many non-linguistic meaning. Perry uses the term
ambiguous for lack of a better word to draw a connection between names and ambiguous
terms. This analogy is also meant to show that the use of context to determine the referent
of a name is different from the use of context for an indexical term. Thus, the Weak
Indexical Theory of Names offers a theory where names are similar to indexicals because
of their reflexive character, and they are similar to ambiguous terms because of their use
of context. Yet, the weak theory thinks that names are neither indexical nor ambiguous
terms.

Conclusion
The Indexical Theory of Names was developed to explain how the referent of a
name can shift over time, like Madagascar. Although, the two alternative versions of the
theory disagreed to what extent names are similar to indexicals. The Strong Indexical
Theory of Names argues that names are indexicals because they are sensitive to the
dubbing-in-force. On the other hand, the Weak Indexical Theory thinks that names were
merely similar to indexicals, but more similar to ambiguous terms, because the role of
context in determining the content. However, for the strong theory, if names are sensitive
to the dubbing-in-force, then ambiguous terms are sensitive to the definition-in-force, and
should be counted as indexicals. Furthermore, the meaning of an unambiguous term
could change in the future, and similar to Madagascar, the meaning changes slowly over
time. So, unambiguous terms should also be counted as indexicals. Yet indexicals are
separated from all other terms because the meaning is singly conventional, while other
terms and names are doubly conventional. Thus we come back to the Weak Indexical
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Theory, where names are indexical-like, but they are more similar to ambiguous terms.
Moreover, the strong theory claims to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes
through an appeal to the linguistic meaning of a name and the reflexive truth conditions.
Nevertheless the weak theory could also appeal to the same strategy for resolving this
puzzle, because the weak theory agrees that names have a linguistic meaning and a
reflexive truth condition. Finally, I respond to the shared names objection by saying that
this objection is based on an equivocation between the linguistic and the non-linguistic
meaning of a name. When two people share a name they share the linguistic meaning of
the name and not the non-linguistic meaning. In the end, there is no reason to prefer the
Strong Indexical Theory of Names as opposed to the Weak Indexical Theory, because the
strong theory leads to the untenable consequence that all terms are indexical, and both the
strong and the weak theories are able to resolve the problem of propositional attitudes in
the same way.
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